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Use of Language and It's Semiotic Power: View HIV/AIDS from Socio- Linguistic Perspectives

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Abstract
Use of language and power in combined form as a ‘’discourse ‘’ against PLWH (people living With HIV/AIDS) and its contentious socio-linguistics and socio-political apprehended have received remarkably little bit of attention existing literature. This article seeks to find out the role of stigmatized language and its power within real life context, particularly forms of expression in several genres and contexts. However , evidence of the HIV/AIDS (Spoiled Identity) was accompanied by the signs and symbols through use of language and power discourse that would be mechanism which were being used and applied as an instrumental tools (consciously and unconsciously) to manage the social heteronormitivity . Indeed, stigmatized language ironically highlights in an unintended manner the social difference between ‘Normal’ and ‘Abnormal/ sick / Deviant ‘’ person. Thus, the socio-linguistic approach suggest itself that account for diverse context dependent critical and social practices.
Keywords: Language, Power, HIV Identity, Socio-Linguistic Approach

Article

“Men do not speak simply to relieve their feelings or to air their views but to awaken a response in their fellows and to influence their attitudes and acts. It is further the means by which men are brought into a new and momentous relationship with the external world, the very relationship which makes for them an objective order”.

‘’ Language is a dialect with an army and navy.’’(Max Weireich, 1982)

We do not want to condemn the word. It is, after all, a mighty instrument; it is the means by which we tell each other of our emotions, the way in which we influence others. Words can do immeasurable good and also terrible injuries. It is true that at first there was the deed; the word came later. It was in some respects cultural progress when the deed became word. But the word was originally a spell, a magical act, and it has retained much of its power. (S. Freud 1930)

I

The language we use often does not reflect the current science or the ways that PLHIV feel about them through language. The use of preferred/less stigmatizing language is important in reducing stigma and discriminatory bahaviours of PLHIV. Language is critical for subsuming our thoughts and experiences under a normatively acceptable mode of communication. Language both constitutes and is constituted by society (Fairclough,1992).The informant's social and psychological cognitive structures (Cicourel 1968; forthcoming) are basic for assigning meanings to objects and events and thus decide the appropriate norms to objects and events and thus decide the appropriate norms to invoke in social settings. For the sociologist this means asking how invoke in social settings. For the sociologist this means asking how the speaker-hearer can articulate perceptual and other non-oral information with speech in deciding to express commitments to social norms. In socialization, acquires and mediated language within the social structure but also internalized the social realities by means of language , thus shaping our consciousness and personality structure . Language use, therefore, encodes perceptual and other (non-oral) information that participants bring to social settings, but this encoding is always a partial enterprise. The social reality which is internalized includes the acquisition and understanding the classification and interpretation of the schemes as well as space,

time , causality motivation and relevance and values hierarchies . But our dependence on language for marking our thoughts and experiences requires that we go beyond the information given by oral and non-oral communication to engage in social interaction and carry out social research (Bruner 1957; Cicourel,). Whorf (1956) , language with different structures conceptualized realities differently . View from social scientists, language as primarily communicative in function as the "conduit metaphor" (Reddy, 1979). This metaphor is rooted in the commonsensical notion that, through speech, one person conveys information by inserting it into words and sending them along a communicative channel. People receive the words at the other end and extract the encoded thoughts and feelings from them. The conduit metaphor reinforces an idea that problems of meaning in human society are essentially *referential or* concerned with how concepts correspond to or represent reality, and that language operates to make propositions about the world (Pitkin, 1972, p. 3). Instead of using the conduit metaphor and referential approach to meaning, scholars recently have approached language as a medium of organized social activity, in which words are "per formatives" (Austin, 1962) or "deeds" (Wittgenstein, 1958, paragraph 546). It is partly through language that humans "do" the social world, even as the world is confronted as the unquestioned background or condition.

Perhaps the most influential, from the words of ***Ludwig Wittgenstein***, who in his own early work was deeply committed to logical positivism and the idea that the function of language is to represent objects in the world. Subscribing to the referential approach to meaning, Wittgenstein thought that the fundamental question about language was the truth or falsity of its propositions. The philosopher's main task was to translate complex sentences into their elementary units in order to assess its truth or falsity (Pitkin, 1972, pp. 27–28). Further, Wittgenstein, disavowed this approach and any rule based approach to language, instead urging the examination of language *practice*—how actors employ words and sentences in concrete situations. Thus, in *Philosophical Investigations* and other posthumous publications, Wittgenstein (1958) argues that language, rather than being a vehicle for naming things, conveying information, or even enacting intentions according to rules, is an *activity* or *form of life* in its own right.

It is in the actual practice of placing words in particular contexts that such resemblances can be traced and the lexical and other components of language appreciated as a form of life. This emphasis on actual practice differs significantly from speech act theory, especially that of Searle. In Wittgenstein's view, just as the word *SICK/Deviant'* might appear in a variety of language games, so might the word *promise*, but rather than deriving its meaning from some underlying constitutive rules, the illocutionary force of the utterance in which it appears derives from its pragmatics, including both vocal and non -vocal signaling as it occurs within the patterning or "grammar" of diverse language games. From this perspective, an investigator would eschew attempts to derive the rules of illocutionary force or to obtain access to speaker intentions and instead would maintain an interest in the overt expressions and acts through which a word such as "promise" comes to life.

From stand of the speech act theorists, the language that humans use can help constitute an infinite variety of social actions (1969, p. 23). In word of Austin (1962, p. 150) suggests that there are on the order of a thousand or so actions, while Wittgenstein (1958, Para. 23) proposes that there are "innumerable" activities in which language plays a part, including but by no means limited to "ordering, describing, reporting, speculating, presenting results, telling a story, being ironic, requesting, asking, criticizing, apologizing, censuring, approving, welcoming, objecting ,guessing, joking, greeting." This list can be indefinitely extended and shows that, as all the speech act theorists would argue, the communicative function of language, wherein people refer to objects and report their thoughts or feelings about them in a verifiable way, is only one among many modes of linguistic usage. When social scientists regard language in this dynamic sense, as intimately bound with action, a seemingly simple problem still looms large for the investigator: How are we to know what the illocutionary force of an utterance is? It is not tenable that the per formative aspect of an utterance is somehow built into its form, for the reason stated above—the "same" utterance can perform a variety of acts. Put differently, the "form" of a sentence or utterance is often misleading about its status as an activity.

Everyday language use against PLWH frequently involves descriptions of courses of action: accounts of the speaker's and others' ordinary conduct. Citing Schegloff (1989), and like Potter and Wetherell (1987, pp. 74–94), Edwards (1997, p. 8) points out that "accounts *of* actions are invariably, and at the same time, accounts *for* actions." Two distinct aspects of these accounts involve *scripts* and *dispositions* (Edwards, 1997, pp. 142–169).

In describing events in terms of scripts, the speakers often implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) propose that what happened followed a routine pattern in the given circumstances. The course of action is then presented as expected, as ordinary, as "natural" one that follows a script. On the other hand, events can also be described as *breaches* from the script, as something unusual and not to be expected. When events are describing as breaches from the script, dispositions often come into play.

Dispositions are "pictures" of the actor implied by the description of the course of action. Two relevant dimensions of dispositions include the personality and the moral character of the actor. Deviations from scripts are often linked to specific dispositions of the actor. However, scripted courses of action can also be linked to dispositions, not least to dispositions of "normality."

While Discursive psychologists are interested specifically in the ways in which the participants' states of knowledge figure in talk (Edwards, 1997, pp. 114–141, 170–201). They examine how emotional and cognitive states are practically accomplished, and how local interactional goals are pursued in and through them. Cognitive states are achieved, for example, through the ways in which statements, stories and descriptions are designed and received in conversation about the PLWH. As conversation analysts , speakers design their talk carefully to show their understanding of the recipients' prior knowledge, and correspondingly, the recipients show through their own action whether the things that were told were new information or already known by them (Sorjonen, 2001).Discursive psychology also investigates descriptions of affect, or the ways in which speakers avow their own emotions and ascribe them to others. In line with other social constructionist approaches (Harré, 1986), research centers on the use of emotional *words* (rather than non-lexical expression of emotion), to show how they are used (Edwards, 1997, p. 170): in assigning causes and motives of action, in blaming, excuses, and accounts…Emotional states may figure as things to be accounted for (in terms of prior causal events or dispositional tendencies, say), as accounts (of subsequent actions and events), and also as evidence of what kind of events or actions precede or follow them.

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II

Work of Vygotsky (1987),and Swain (2006, p. 148) argues as follows:

''Languaging serves as a vehicle through which thinking is articulated and transformed into an artifactual form. … Ideas are crystallized. They become available as an object about which questions can be raised and answers can be explored with others or with the self. In other words, languaging is a process which creates a visible or audible product about which one can language further.''

We have to move at the issue of POWER which associated with Language: the power of those who can use language for their various vested interests, as is expressed in the quotations above. Language (and other symbolic systems) is used to determine and define similarities and differences; to draw clear BOUNDARIES between 'us' and 'them/others'. This is because the notion of identity presupposes that there are similarities/equivalences (idem and ipse, Ricoeur 1992) and differences. These differences are then evaluated: and thereby an ideological moment is often implicitly (and sometimes also explicitly) introduced through various kinds of categorization. Used of powerful language by the hands of politicians serves to persuade people of intentionally established boundaries and, as has been poignantly expressed by, inter alia, Karl Kraus, language can be used to pave the way for physical violence (Klemperer 2005). Words then become weapons, and words can also be used to legitimate weapons, as has been shown in many detailed studies (e.g. Fairclough 1989; Chilton 2004; Wodak 2009a, b).

Language gains the power to create ‘’the socially real’’ through the illocutionary acts of speaking subjects. There appear to be two levels of reality, two orders of ontology , in Wittig’s theory .Language for Wittig’s is set of act, repeated over time , that produced reality- effects that are eventually misperceived as facts.

The power Wittig’s accords to this ‘system’ of language is enormous . concepts, categories, and abstractions , She argues , can effects a physical and material violence against the bodies they claim to organized and interpreted :’’ There is nothing abstract about the power that sciences and theories have to act materially and actually upon our bodies and minds , even the discourse that produces it is abstract . It is one of the forms of domination , it is very expression , as Marx said. I would say, rather, one of it exercises , All of the oppressed know this power and have had to deal with it’’.

In this regard three different dimensions of power have been identified (see Holzscheiter 2005): ‘power in discourse’, ‘power over discourse’, and ‘power of discourse’.

The first of these means the struggle over meanings and interpretations of terms and discourses. This struggle over SEMIOTIC HEGEMONY refers to the choice of ‘specific linguistic codes, rules for interaction, rules for access to the meaning-making forum, rules for decision-making, turn-taking, opening of sessions, making contributions and interventions’ (Holzscheiter 2005: 69).

‘Power over discourse’ generally means access to publics, i.e. the extent to which specific actors become seen and heard (ibid.: 57).

And the ‘power of discourse’ implies ‘the influence of historically grown macro-structures of meaning, of the conventions of the language game in which actors find themselves’ (ibid.).

These struggles for power are not always visible, but sometimes happen beneath the surface. Here, as Steven Lukes (2005 [1974]: 28), who formulates the ideological-hegemonic aspects of power as follows: Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they see it as natural and interchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? The borderlines between us and others are, of course, not set in stone; boundaries can be shifted, allegiances change and are changed, depending on political and other interests. In our transnational and globalised society, borderlines have often been, and still are, very important: borders between states, the border of the Schengen Zone, linguistic boundaries. This raises the questions of which boundaries can be crossed, when, how, and by whom; and moreover, who are the GATEKEEPERS who make and take the decisions on who is allowed to cross boundaries?

III

The work of West (1984) has been particularly influential in this condition . With respect to various literature on HIV/AIDS, the narrative productions of HIV/AIDS patients are insightfully researched, and scholars such as Leonard and Ellen (2008) analyze the ways in which the narratives of HIV-positive patients are shaped by social and institutional practices. Eggly (2002), in fact, makes the case for an expanded definition of ‘narrative’ in physician–patient communication. In her view, narratives can be redefined with respect to the narrative forms that emerge through the co-construction of key events, the repetition and elaboration of key events and the co-constructed interpretation of key events. Living with a chronic illness such as HIV/AIDS requires that individuals contemplate the effect of that illness on oneself. A person’s self is also adjusted shaped and changed throughout life. Those that champion identity theory assert that “persons have as many identities as distinct networks of relationships in which they occupy positions and play roles” (Stryker & Burke, 2000, p. 286). Rooted in structural symbolic interactionism, Stryker’s strand of identity theory has several points.

First, individuals’ access to smaller social networks is influenced by “the larger social structure within which the networks are embedded” (Burke & Stets, 2009, p. 45). Hence, different networks are available to different individuals.

Second, different roles can be enacted across a variety of networks and these roles are arranged in a salience hierarchy with the more salient identities more likely to be enacted across various contexts (Stryker, 1980).

Third, the salience of an identity depends on the commitment to that identity which can be measured by the "number of persons one is related to through that identity" and the depth of ties to others based on that identity (Burke & Stets, 2009, p. 47). With HIV/AIDS considered a chronic disease and since identity development is a lifelong process, a question of interest has concerned how individuals incorporate HIV/AIDS into one's Self. Although researchers have examined this question to some extent (Awa, & Yamashita, 2009; Baumgartner, 2007; Baumgartner & David, 2009; Dozier, 1997; Gurevich, 1996; Lewis, 1994; Sandstrom, 1990; Tewksbury & McGaughey, 1998), they have paid scant attention to the influence of various contexts on the identity incorporation process. These contexts include the socio-cultural (e.g., race, class, gender and culture), interpersonal (e.g., support and stigma), temporal (e.g., developmental stage in a person's life or social time, historical time, chronological time and the passage of time), and situational (e.g., contexts specific to that person's experience such as pregnancy) (Ichovics, Thayaparan, & Ethier, 2001; Neugarten & Datan, 1973).

Scholars such as C. Candlin and S. Candlin (2002, 2003), for example, have been particularly active in framing applied linguistics debates on health communication. Their 2002 special issue of the *Journal of Language & Social Interaction* on 'Expert talk and risk in health care' examines the expertise with which

practitioners and their clients manage risk situations in genetic counseling, nursing and medical practice (Candlin, 2002; Linell *et al*., 2002; Peräkylä, 2002; Sarangi & Clarke, 2002).

Accounts of HIV/AIDS Identity :

Identity is the central theme in discursive psychology. In and through their talk, speakers present themselves, those that they talk to, and those that they talk about, as having particular

identities, as being particular persons and particular sorts of persons. Just like mental states discussed above, also the identity is, as Antaki and Widdicombie (1998, p. 1) put it, both an *achievement* and a *tool*: identity is achieved in and through the talk, and it is used as a tool in performing particular actions in talk. Or to put it in terms used by Edwards and Potter (1992, p. 192), "…detailed language of describing persons is a resource for action." For example, in blaming the other or in defending one's own (or the other's) actions, speakers ascribe and avow particular motives and personality features, and thereby construct identities (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, pp. 110–115). Drawing on Sacks' work (see the section on conversation analysis below), Antaki and Widdicombie (1998, pp. 3–6) emphasize the centrality of *categorization* in the construction of identity: "to have an identity" entails being "cast into a category with associated characteristics or features." Categories can, of course, be numerous, the most general ones including age, ethnic, gender and professional categories. In investigating categorization, Antaki and Widdicombie (1998) point out, a key challenge is to show how a particular categorization is *oriented to* by the interactants, and how this orientation is *consequential* for their joint courses of action. "Description as action" is the primary topic of research in discursive psychology. In recent years, the research methodology of discursive psychologists has come very close to that in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. Therefore, the ways in which discursive psychology deals with the mapping problem are more or less the same as those in conversation

analysis, and we can postpone the discussion on them until we have introduced conversation analysis in more detail.

The historically grounded, socially constituted knowledge, skills, beliefs and attitudes comprising our various social identities – predisposing us to act, think and feel in particular ways and to perceive the involvement of others in certain ways – constitute what social theorist Pierre Bourdieu calls our

habitus (Bourdieu, 1977). We approach our activities with the perceptions and evaluations we have come to associate with both our ascribed and appropriated social identities and those of our interlocutors, and we use them to make sense

of each other's involvement in our encounters. That is to say, when we come together in a communicative event we perceive ourselves and others in the manner in which we have been socialized. We carry expectations, built up over time through socialization into our own

social groups, about what we can and cannot do as members of our various groups. We hold similar expectations about what others are likely to do and not do as members of their particular groups. The linguistic resources we use to communicate, and our interpretations of those used by others, are shaped by these mutually held perceptions. However, unlike the more traditional 'linguistics applied' view, which views **agency** as an inherent motivation of individuals, a socio-cultural perspective views it as the 'socio- culturally mediated capacity to act' (Ahearn, 2001: 112), and thus locates it in the discursive spaces between individual users and the conditions of the moment. In our use of language we represent a particular identity at the same time that we construct it. The degree of individual effort we can exert in shaping our identities, however, is not always equal. Rather, it is 'an aspect of the action' (Altieri, 1994: 4) negotiable in and arising from specific social and cultural circumstances constituting local contexts of action.

As with the meanings of our linguistic actions, however, how linguistically pliable our identities are depends to a large extent on the historical and sociopolitical forces embodied in them. Thus, while we have some choice in the ways we choose to create ourselves, our every action takes place within a social context, and thus can never be understood apart from it. Therefore individual agency is neither inherent in nor separate from individual action. Rather 'it exists through routinized action that includes the material (and physical) conditions as well as the social actors' experience in using their bodies while moving through a familiar space' (Duranti, 1997: 45). According to Anthony Giddens, in his Structuration Theory,as individual agency is a semiotic activity, a social construction, 'something that has to be

routinely created and sustained in the refl exive activities of the individual' (Giddens, 1991: 52). In our locally occasioned social actions, we, as individual agents, shape and at the same time are given shape by what Giddens refers to as **social structures** – conventionalised, established ways of doing things. In our actions we draw on these structures and in so doing recreate them and ourselves as social actors.

While Giddens is not particularly concerned with identity and language use *per se*, his ideas are useful in that, by locating individual action in the mutually constituted, continual production of our everyday lives – the dialogue (Bakhtin, 1986) between structure and action – Giddens's social theory provides us with a framework for understanding the inextricable link between human agency and social institutions.

Also infl uential to current understandings is the notion of **habitus**, as popularized by social theorist Pierre Bourdieu. According to Bourdieu (1977, 2000), habitus is a set of bodily dispositions acquired through extended engagement in our everyday activities that dispose us to act in certain ways. We bring them with us to our social experiences, and are inclined to make sense of our experiences, and coordinate our actions with others in particular ways. For both Giddens and Bourdieu, individual identity is not a precondition of social action but rather arises from it. Moreover, in the recursive process of identity production, individuals are constituted 'neither free agents nor completely socially determined products' (Ahearn, 2000: 120).

interactional sociolinguistics (IS), an approach that, to a large extent, is based on the work of linguistic anthropologist John Gumperz (1981, 1982a, 1982b) , defines these cues as any verbal sign which when processed in co-occurrence with symbolic grammatical and lexical signs serves to construct the contextual ground for situated interpretations, and thereby affects how constituent messages are understood. The cues encompass various forms of speech production including the lexical, syntactic, pragmatic and paralinguistic. Included turn-taking patterns, and even the language code itself. The cues provide individual interlocutors with recognizable markers for signaling and interpreting **contextual presuppositions**. Such signals, in turn, allow for the mutual adjustment of perspectives as the communicative event unfolds.

IV

From sociology of Language , symbolic interactionists have been most concerned with language. This is no doubt due to the influence of Mead (1934), who originated the suggestion that humans employ *significant symbols* that, when emitted by one party, elicit the same response in that party as in the party to whom the symbol is directed. This suggestion assumes significance in a larger context than social psychology, however. Sociologists regard communication as achieving a solution to "the problem of meaning," which Weber (1947) long ago identified as being at the core of social action, for the defining criterion of such action is that it is a product of the interactive interpretations of society's members. When ***Mead (1934***) proposed the existence of significant symbols and the capacity for "taking the role of the other," it seemed to represent a clear statement of how humans could form common understandings, produce mutual and complementary stances within what he called the "social act," and also thereby provide for larger patterns of social life. From ideas like Mead's and a more general concern with the problem of meaning, it is easy to see how social psychologists moved to the conduit metaphor when discussing human language, seeing it as a repository of significant symbols in which people package their ideas and feelings. Significant symbols include not only words but gestures as well, although there are two views of gestural communication. In one view, gestures are substituted for words.

The lesson for the "communicational" view of language is that the locutions through which persons provide information about their thoughts, feelings, and ideas occur as part of some context of acting and are, like promising, naming, giving, and so on, illocutionary:

One of Austin's successors, Searle (1969, pp. 16–17), more forcefully states that the:

'' unit of linguistic communication is not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol, word, or sentence…but rather the production of the symbol or word or sentence in the performance of a speech act,"

Both Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) attempt to come to grips with the well-known problem in the philosophy of language that a sentence with a given reference and predication can have an assortment of meanings.

The ***Whorfian hypothesis*** suggests an iconic relation between language and thought—that is, that language determines thought. Early on, Lenneberg (1953) and Brown (1958) pointed out the logical flaws in this proposition. For a more recent critique, see Pinker (1994, chapter 3).

This is true, as Boden (1990, p. 245) remarks, even in symbolic interactionist studies, which, despite interest in people's *defining* activities, have accorded language very little direct attention.

A different idea— that language is a site of social activity—stems from developments in what

is called ordinary language philosophy. A variety of scholars, including Austin, Ryle, Searle,

and Wittgenstein, take the position that problems of meaning and reference in traditional philosophy—and, by extension, issues concerning how and under what conditions interactants

communicate effectively with one another—can be fruitfully recast through investigation of ordinary language. This means avoiding the abstracting and generalizing process whereby words serve to reference or point to objects and situating words in orderly contexts to appreciate how words achieve actions.

Despite the relativity it implies, the ***Whorfian hypothesis*** is compatible with the conduit metaphor and communicational view of language in that it proposes the very source of an individual's experience. Once individuals have learned the group's language, they have acquired the symbolic means for having emotions, beliefs, perceptions, and so on and transmitting them to one another. Of course, most social psychologists argue that language and experience reciprocally influence one another. Nevertheless, in studies where language is a prominent variable, it remains as a relatively static repository of meanings† that either conditions or is conditioned by those social factors of interest to the investigator. Later, we show that in traditional studies, social structure is often conveyed by the conduit of communication. Overall, then, language has been important to social psychology because it represents a vital medium whereby actors can communicate with one another and

thereby set up joint projects according to preexisting social arrangements. In this view, the manipulation of significant symbols is a precursor to action and behavior is the product of linguistically achieved common understandings.

Although a number of sociologists, anthropologists, and linguists have affiliated with the term

sociolinguistics, it is, as its name implies, a field linked to linguistics proper. Pioneers in sociolinguistics, such as Gumperz (1972), Hymes (1974), and Labov (1972b), were wrestling with a legacy of theorizing about language that posited its fundamental forms as being cognitive or minded phenomena. This legacy started with Ferdinand de Saussure's (1962) famous distinction between *langue*, which comprises an underlying systematic across variations in social context, and *parole*, which consists of the actual speech that people produce. In de Saussure's (1962) view, the proper focus of study was *langue*, the idea being that human cognition was the seat of linguistic structures and categories that guided people's behavior. In contemporary times, Noam Chomsky (1965) has continued the cognitive legacy with his very influential notion of generative grammar, a set of psychologically based universal structures whose systematic transformations result in an infinite variety of human speech productions. With its emphasis on Cartesian mental properties, structural linguistics has always sought to de-contextualize linguistic phenomena in favor of finding certain ideal properties of abstracted sentences. That is, the overwhelming tendency has been to view linguistic structure as extant outside of time and place and hence not subject to social influence. Sociolinguists, following scholars such as Firth (1935), Malinoswski (1923), and others, were utterly dissatisfied with such a view. As Hymes (1974, pp. 2–3) has argued, the frame of reference of the *social* scientific investigation of language could not be linguistic forms in themselves, and must substitute the community context as a frame. Indeed, Labov (1972b, p. xiii) resisted the term sociolinguistics because he could not conceive of linguistic theory or method that did *not* incorporate a social component. The social component would include cultural values, social institutions, community history and ecology, and so on (Hymes, 1974, p. 3). While sociolinguists agree that social influence is crucial to understanding linguistic structure, there are different perspectives on the relationship between society and language (Grimshaw, 1974) and different strategies for investigating this relationship. The earliest sociolinguistic studies used dialect surveys to study speech variation among social networks and communities, finding that dialect variables were an excellent gauge of both social class and ethnic identity (Gumperz & Hymes, 1972, p. 12). Variation in linguistic patterns is a prominent theme in sociolinguistics. Besides dialect usage, another example of variation is *code switching* (Ervin-Tripp, 1972), or the manner in which members of a single community juxtapose, in the same situation, speech belonging to different grammatical systems (Breitborde, 1983; Fishman, 1983; Gumperz, 1982). *Interpretive sociolinguists* argue that code switching reflects speakers' ability to categorize situations, interlocutors, and social relationships and thereby to make inferences and judgments about the appropriate and relevant speech forms to produce. Whereas the presumption in sociolinguistic survey research is that language usage is normatively guided, interpretive studies propose that ethnographic investigation is necessary to define the *competence* with which interact ants manipulate linguistic markers and devices to obtain their ordinary goals in everyday life (Gumperz, 1982, pp. 35–36):

The analyst's task is to make an in depth study of selected instances of verbal interaction, observe whether or not actors understand each other, elicit participants' interpretations of what goes on, and then (a) deduce the social assumptions that speakers must have made in order to act as they do, and (b) determine empirically how linguistic signs communicate in the interpretation process. These strategies are compatible with Hymes's (1974) comprehensive outline of the "ethnography of communication," a way of collecting, categorizing, and analyzing the action oriented linguistic events in a particular community to answer the basic questions of what these events are and how they work. Sociolinguistics has been occupied with numerous topics surrounding code switching, including second language learning and the relation of diverse languages to self concept, personality, and status attitudes. Other classic topics in sociolinguistics are language conflict, loyalty, and maintenance and the structure and organization of pidgin and creole languages.

Socio-linguistics emphasize the importance of micro-analysis of minute particles of speech and single interactional events as a means for understanding the social dimensions of language use. Both areas invoke rule-like mechanisms

for connecting social environments and structures to these particles and events. In Goffman (1983)'s work, we begin to see less emphasis on the connective or even casual approach to rules and more concern with social actors' agency and rule usage. Rather than a broader social context, the corporeal "face to face" or "body to body" situation—whether in urban or in rural areas, in a business or in a family, and independent of socioeconomic class, gender or ethnic categories— should be the primary focus for understanding social interaction. That is, the same rules and conventions, applying to turn-taking, physical distance between speakers, and other matters, prevail in social interaction regardless its broader context. Or to take a more specific example:

Goffman (1983) refers to a "contact" ritual, such as any service encounter where customers

may form a queue as they await their turn at being helped. Although the queue could be organized according to externally structured attributes of involved parties (e.g., age, race, gender, or class), normal queuing "blocks" or filters out the effects of such variables in favor of an egalitarian, first-come, first-serve ordering principle. Such an ordering principle belongs to what Goffman (1983) calls the "interaction order," which consists of "systems of enabling conventions, in the sense of ground rules for a game, the provisions of a traffic code, or the syntax of a language." The interaction order is relatively autonomous order of organization both in relation to the broader social organization and to the psychological properties of the actors. Hence, Goffman wanted to promote it as a target of social scientific study in its own right. Although the interaction order consists largely of rules or conventions, violations do not threaten the game or the language as much as they serve as resources for accomplishing the very projects that adherence itself involves, including the definition of self and the creation or maintenance of social meaning (Goffman, 1971, p. 61):

Given that a rule exists against seeking out a stranger's eyes, seeking can then be done as a means of making a pickup or as a means of making one known to someone one expects to meet but is unacquainted with. Similarly, given that staring is an invasion of information preserve, a stare can then be used as a warranted negative sanction against someone who has misbehaved—the misbehavior providing and ensuring a special significance to overlong examination. Actors, in this view, do not range between naive conformity and blatant rule breaking. Rules, says Goffman (1971, p. 61) make possible a *set* of "no adherences," which, according to how we classify the interactional work they do, have a variety of meanings. The interactional rules do not tightly constrain actions; they are more like rough guidelines that permit actors to accomplish a variety of social projects, depending on how they align themselves with respect to those rules or guidelines. This point about actors' capacity for flexible alignment to rules is most fully developed in *Frame Analysis*, Goffman's (1974) major treatise on the "organizational premises" of ordinary activity, or, the "reality" of everyday experience. Much of everyday experience goes beyond literal activity and has numerous figurative aspects, which are especially visible in talk (Goffman, 1974, p. 502). In particular, Goffman (1974, chapter 13) argues that rather than using terms such as *speaking* and *hearing* to characterize the production and understanding of utterances, analysts must see how participants align themselves to those utterances. A speaker, for instance, may employ a variety of *production formats* when talking, so that he/she says something as *principal* (one whose position is represented as a normal in the talk) or as

animator (who simply speaks the words representing another's position). As principal or animator, one can also project a particular identity or figure (ranging from that of the speaker to identities of fictitious and actual others). Finally, a speaker can be a strategist who acts to promote the interests of an individual on whose behalf he/she is acting. In a way complementary to speakers, hearers also take up different alignments or participation statuses—ratified recipient, overhearer, eavesdropper, and so on. Eventually, Goffman (1979) referred to the frame analysis of talk as an investigation of the "footing" or stances that participants constantly change over the course of an utterance's production. Goffman's work on footing has been taken up in a variety of contemporary studies, including those on children's arguments (Goodwin, 1988; Goodwin, 1990), the news interview (Clayman, 1988), and the survey interview (Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2000). While the ethonomethodologist and phenomenological sociologist who are concerned primarily with what linguistic categories mean to members of society in everyday life and their implication of members actions . From the prior perspectives meaning not as determined by the abstract

structures but rather as an accomplishment of members as they engaged in social interaction . For them , language is not something used in interaction, language is interaction .

V

Final Remarks:

In this article, use of language and power is based on several key premises. One of the more significant premises replaces the traditional understanding of language users as unitary, unique and internally motivated individuals with a view of language users as social actors whose identities are multiple, varied and emergent from their everyday lived experiences. Through involvement in their socio culturally significant activities, individuals take on or inhabit particular social identities as a Deviant, and use their understandings of their social roles and relationships to others to mediate their involvement and the involvement of others in their practices. These identities are not stable or held constant across contexts, but rather are emergent, locally situated and at the same time historically constituted, and thus are 'precarious, contradictory and in process, constantly being reconstituted in discourse each time we think or speak' (Weedon, 1997: 32).

In the contexts of our experience we use language not as solitary, isolated Individuals giving voice to personal intentions. Rather, we 'take up a position in a social field in which all positions are moving and defined relative to one another' (Hanks, 1996: 201). Social action becomes a site of dialogue, in some cases of consensus, in others of struggle where, in choosing among the various linguistic resources available (and not so available) to us in our role. Simultaneously, recognizes the culture does not exist apart from language or apart from us, as language users. It sees culture, instead, as reflexive, made and remade in our language games, our lived experiences, and 'exist[ing] through routinized action that includes the material (and physical) conditions as well as the social actors' experience in using their bodies while moving through a familiar space' (Duranti, 1997: 45). On this view, no use of language, no individual language user, is considered to be 'culture-free'. Rather, in our every communicative encounter we are always at the same time carriers and agents of culture.

Power is the capacity to realize one's interests. The principal claim of this paper is the recognition that the issue of power within our context is the issue of the power as it appears in language. This recognition places the study of power on a firmer theoretical basis and enables us to behave in a more analytical way.

This understanding does not; of course solve the question of where to place ourselves with regard to various solutions of the language/power issue. It jolts us not only into recognizing the language and power issues associated with HIV/AIDS awareness but also demand the social urgency, need to speak openly and fearlessly in this concern but also open up the new framework to make substantive connections between conceptualizing and operational zing the local knowledge and language and its reality which around the HIV/AIDS related quires. These article principle goals are to be understood the how knowledge about the HIV/AIDS has to be formulated through the language, power, identity construction and semiotics. While there may be medical engagement and state initiative public health planning and policies to alleviate the biological threat of HIV/AIDS.

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