Review Article: From War to Peace: Fateful Decisions in International Politics

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Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond co-authored the book "From War to Peace: Fateful Decisions in International Politics". This edition reviewed was jointly published by Peking University Press and Thomson Learning in 2003. The original edition was published in 2002 by Bedford/St. Martin's division of Thomson Learning. Kegley is a co-founder of Kegley International, Inc. and Distinguished Pearce Professor of International Relations at the University of South Carolina, USA. He served as chairman of the Department of Government and International, co-director of the Byrnes International Center as well as the president of the International Studies Association. He also held various faculty appointments at Georgetown University, the University of Texas, the People's University of China, Rutgers University, the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales in Geneva, and was a Pew Faculty Fellow at Harvard University. Some award winning publications are in his name. Greg Raymond is Distinguished Professor at Boise State University, USA where he taught courses in the field of International Relations. He also served as director of the Survey Research Center, chairman of the Political Science Department as well as director of the University Honors College and has presented on many international conferences. He is also credited with other excellent publications.

"From War to Peace: Fateful Decisions in International Politics" is a book of foreign policy with a subject matter on decisions of war making and the construction of peace that follows war. The authors' central theme focuses on the conditions that condition the dilemmas intrinsic to the choices of making external war and peace.[1] The book basically links "the end of war and the maintenance of peace" (p.3). It presents important concepts for thinking, analyzing and discussing war and peace decision making with critical linkages to historical case studies of a number of pivotal or major wars and the construction of peaceful settlements thereafter. In doing so, they hoped to answer two related questions as: Why do states go to war? And how can they create a lasting peace after the war (p.3)? It must be noted that the fulcrum of the study of International Relations is the study on the relationship between war and peace and how both affect our international body politics. Therefore a book on war and peace such as this cannot just be positioned on War and Peace shelf in the library but rather among those on International Relations. An essential component of "From War to Peace: Fateful Decisions in International Politics", is the ethical values attached to the choices of making war and peace. It highlights how normative issues affect our international body politics through the lenses of war and peace.

The book is explicitly divided into five main parts of varying lengths and themes, albeit the general subject matter – decisions of war making and the construction of peace thereafter – is implicitly kept with a total of nine chapters (pp. II–IV). The first part is composed of only one chapter: chapter one (pp.1–40). It established the road map and framework that the authors used for examining the decisions and conditions of war making and peace. It was the preamble chapter. The various concepts and theories on which decisions on war and peace are made particularly realism[2] (human nature is essentially evil, pursuit of national self-interest, self-help, military power and capabilities, balance of power, zero-sum game, transnational and multinational institutions and organizations cannot be trusted) and liberalism[3] (human nature is essentially good, self-preserving and material welfare is the main concern, reciprocity, positive sum game, believe in transnational and multinational organizations, war is not inevitable) were introduced (pp.11–13).

The introductory chapter also sets in motion and clarifies the various factors that most influence decision makers' choices of war and peace as war is getting to a close. This was done through the good old levels of analysis or images of international relations propounded by Kenneth Waltz[4] (pp.31–40). In the introductory chapter, the authors clearly established the premise that militaries exhaustion and resources

depletion are not the only sources of barriers to "capitalizing their military accomplishments". Therefore "military mastery alone is unlikely to provide an enduring triumph; victors need a coherent peace plan for the postwar world" (p.4). This coherent peace plan was referred to as "grand strategy" (p.24). Based on this premise, it would not be out of place to argue that it was on this basis that the United States negotiated on the formation of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference (pp.138–147) and the United Nations Organization (pp.162–167) after World War I and World War II respectively; argued for the resuscitation and reconstruction of Germany (pp.172–176) and Japan (pp.176–178) after World War II; the drafting of the Marshal Plan to reconstruct Europe and other related post war peace settlements.[5]

The authors tells us that decision making for end of war settlements as war draws to a close is usually at the bosom of the victor however such decisions are "fateful, heavily influencing whether the defeated will accept or reject the postwar settlement and whether their role in the postwar world will ultimately be constructive or destructive" (p.4). As we understood, two conditions could ensure "enduring rivalry" between or among States if the end of war settlements is not accepted as just by the vanquished; and when "peace treaties do not dispel …deep-seated passions" but rather serve as "pauses in an ongoing feud". Peace in this kind enables "the issues that initially caused the dispute to become militarized continue festering" (p.12) and serves as an "interlude during which one side or the other longs for revenge and methodically works to settle old scores" (p.5). It is a period for regrouping and restructuring and re-strategizing when one is weak to attack when one becomes stronger. For example, as the authors explicitly showed, Germany's rejection of the terms of the World War I settlement partially resulted in the World War II (pp.142–150).

The authors formulated their prescriptions for constructing a peace settlement after war in this preamble chapter using the outcome and settlement methodologies of two ancient wars – The Peloponnesian War and Punic Wars – where they averred that victors have two policy options of "choosing between reconciliation and retribution" where either "defeated troops receive mercy, and noncombatants are treated with compassion" or "victors may espouse values that downplay clemency in favor of harsh punishment"(p.18). As shown by the actors, none of the two approaches is free of flaws and both are susceptible to failures. However I believe that the failures associated with these approaches are not embedded in the individual approaches itself as an independent variable but rather stems from States lack of a grand strategy as war winds to a close as little thought are "given to designing a political grand strategy for the postwar world" (p. 24).

The argument now is that the rise of China and its speedy economic strengthening makes it a major discussion in our world of international relations vis-à-vis war and peace considering in fact its warring past, decades of crises and the peace settlements that followed those crises when it was weak. Based on Kegley and Raymond's preamble of fateful decisions at the end of war that could either ensure enduring peace or enduring rivalry and being influenced by whether the defeated accepts or rejects such decisions, the question now is has China or does China accepts those decisions made at the end of wars during the time it was weak?

Chinese first foreign contacts resulted in a clash of orders and ethics – the sales and smuggling of opium – culminating in forced opening and its attendant Opium wars, 1839 -1842 and 1856 – 1860 and "unequal treaties" – legalization of opium trade; minimal Chinese tariffs on imports; payment of indemnity to cover the cost of lost opium; ceding of Hong Kong to Britain; adoption of a most-favored-nation treatment; adoption of a treaty of extraterritoriality (foreign states exercised jurisdiction over their nationals residing in Chinese treaty ports); forced opening of other Chinese ports to foreign vessels and merchants; acceptance of foreign ambassadors in Beijing and offering equal treatment – leading to "centuries of humiliation" until the unification of the country in 1949.[6] Although China has greatly benefitted through the 1945 Yalta Conferences and also from the current liberal world economic order established by the United States after World War II and many arguments allude to the fact that the current buoyant economic growth of China is as a result of this liberal economic world order, Chinese have forever considered these milestones as unequal and humiliation and a dark side of their glories history.

Today Beijing has a strong desire to "achieve rejuvenation" to recapture ancient pride and glories and seeking to avoid interference from all angles and tries very hard to lead world governance or at least have a share in it or be part of it.[7] Are China's actions motivated by its acceptance of rejection of the end of war decisions made when it was weak? The prospect of war and peace depends on the behavior of China in relations to its acceptance of the end of war decisions or its rejection in order to rewrite them or seek revenge. However, the book did not address this very important issue. For a book on war, peace and security published in 2002 to be silent on this dynamics of a

possibility of conflict or war and peace in quite unacceptable and I think this is one weakness of this book. It does not allocate any chapter or even a sub-topic to discuss this current war and peace dynamics.

The second part is composed of three chapters: chapters' two to four. Starting with the Thirty Years War and its subsequent Westphalian Peace (pp.47–78), part two gives an exposition into historical antecedents of fateful war and peace decisions of European State system that affected our world of international politics today. It was a historical pathway used as a framework to understand current global developments on war and peace making decisions. In this regard several key concepts such as security dilemma[8] (p.52); balance of power[9] and collective security[10] (p.73); rational choice[11] (p.64); sovereignty, equality of states and nonintervention (pp.72–74); hegemony and polarity (pp.50–51); and other related international relations concepts were discussed. Expositions on history of war and peace making decisions were furthered through chapter three where the French Revolution (pp.84–86); Napoleon Wars (pp.87–92); Concert of Europe (pp.95–97) and chapter four where the wars and peace of German unification (pp.108–121) were all discussed. These historical great wars offered roadmap into thinking about "principles and practices of statecraft that may prevent a relapse into the terrifying ordeal" that have ever plagued this world (p.45). These fateful decisions of war and peace, the authors opined were greatly influenced by balance of power politics.

It is significant to note that these historical wars were major wars because they changed the structure of the international system or at least the structure of European politics which hitherto had an externality on the wider world politics because "it introduced a new set of organizing principles that still color our view of international politics". Today we someway somehow live in the shadows of "a horizontal world order composed of sovereign territorial states with no higher authority above them to manage their relations" (p.45) in what IR studies have generally concluded as anarchy[12] although I believe that this term is misplaced. The authors had a believe that balance of power constructed the long peace after the Thirty Years War and when "Europe once again faced an aspiring hegemon, only a coalition of great powers was able to block its ambition" and at the Vienna Congress of 1815 after Napoleonic Wars, European great powers "restored the Westphalian system of sovereign equals and make a series of territorial adjustments to prevent any single state from commanding sufficient resources to threaten the rest" (p.46).

The Concert of Europe based on "compromise and collaboration" was included in the end of war fateful decisions at Vienna after the Wars of Napoleon which was "a collaborative security mechanism for great-power consultation and policy coordination that included a defeated France" (p. 46). Great powers sought to maintain order by holding periodic conferences to deliberate jointly and strike agreements to deal with emerging crisis and to preserve the balance of power. It was based on the assumption that "discussion and consensus building among those at the apex of the global hierarchy would produce multilateral decision making on divisive issues" (p.95). Under conditions of uncertainty, Europe made fateful choices that traded off moral values and dilemmas with allegiance to secular political authority. In effect, religion and a clash of values surrendered to political authority – sovereign state organizing statecraft.

Although balance of power worked to some extent to keep a long peace from Westphalia until Napoleon Wars and its subsequent peace after Vienna 1815 until the war in 1914, I believe that peace was not dependent on balance of power politics. Balance of power was not the independent variable for peace rather the larger end of war negotiations was. As the authors rightly pointed out in their introductory chapter, "military mastery alone is unlikely to provide an enduring triumph; victors need a coherent peace plan for the postwar world" however I argue this peace plan was not in balance of power (p.4). The long peace could be attributed to how the wars ended and their settlements thereafter. With the Thirty Years War, although some empires or states were placed disadvantages after the war, "a number autonomous political units had virtually fought to a draw" and with "none powerful enough to defeat all others", "they lacked the strength to impose their will on each other decisively". In fact they had become battle-hardened and exhausted that, they themselves were desperate to end war for peace.[13]

Moreover on the end of war settlement, although "the negotiators at Munster and Osnabruck were embittered by the brutality of the war, and had powerful incentives to draft a punitive peace treaty", they realized that "wanton vindictiveness had the potential to degenerate into an endless blood feud" therefore "the peacemakers substituted retributive justice for outright revenge" (p.71). A further act of retribution was shown through the principle of state sovereignty and equality for all including newly emerged powers as well as established powers "as all states were equal under the law irrespective of religion and form of government, equally able to make the laws that would govern

international society, and equally independent from any higher supranational authority to manage their relations" (p.73). In fact liberal theoretical prescriptions of peace prevailed over realist settlement.

With Napoleonic wars and its subsequent Congress of Vienna, France – the defeated party – was allowed back into the realm of the great powers through the Concert of Europe. A liberal reconciliation justice of rapprochement was offered to France instead a realist punitive justice. In effect the authors merely fell into the trap of balance of power assumption but balance of power was not the underlying cause of peace after those great wars.

In part three, the authors transported us through an undulating terrain of limited sangfroid and skirmishes to look at a more modern fateful decisions and choices leaders made towards war and its peace thereafter, from war to peace and vice versa when for the first time in the history of mankind "fully mobilized societies and weapons of frightening destructive capability…threatened national annihilation" – World War I and World War II (p.126). A closer look and a juxtaposition of the two World Wars clearly unveil how they affected each other in terms of the fateful decisions made and choices opted as war winded down which were in part affected by the rippling effects from the Wars of German Unification as France who was "particularly hard hit since most of the major battles on the western front occurred on its soil" and its "national reconstruction was hampered by the need to service the enormous foreign debt incurred to finance the war effort" , "sought to revenge for its humiliating loss to Germany in 1871" and "harsh peace treaty imposed upon them by Germans following the Franco Prussian War in 1871" in order to "weaken Germany so it no longer posed a military threat" (pp.127–128). They simply put it as "the story of a series of fateful decisions made during the first half of the twentieth century that ultimately shaped the second half of the century" (p.126).

The authors clearly reminded us that enduring peace or rivalry heavily depend on "whether the defeated will accept or reject the postwar settlement and whether their role in the postwar world will ultimately be constructive or destructive" (p.4) and whether the end of war settlement or treaties could "dispel the…deep-seated passions" of hostilities and rather not serve as "pauses in an ongoing feud" because peace in this kind enables "the issues that initially caused the dispute to become militarized continue festering" (p.12) and serves as an "interlude during which one side or the other longs for revenge and methodically works to settle old scores" (p.5). In effect, soldiers and weapons do not win wars, "a coherent peace plan for the postwar world" by diplomats and negotiators does.

World War I which was a result of previous end of war settlement, nationalism, economic competition, alliances, military buildups and offensive military doctrines and strategies and other factors including personalities ended with the Treaty of Versailles that gave birth to the League of Nations which was proposed by Woodrow Wilson in his fourteen points albeit the United States could not get to be part of its operations. It was supposed to be based on trust, open alliances and collective security, self-determination, negotiation, mediation and arbitration, international law and democracy, free and open trade, disarmament[14] (pp.135–142). However due to its architect's failure to be part of its operation, a deviation of its operation as well as a clash of interests among victors concerning the vanquished – Germany – on areas such as territorial boundaries, reparation payments, disarmament, collective security; "Wilsonianism" declined and the Treaty of Versailles that created the League of Nations "was not a peace settlement; it was merely an armistice for twenty years" that deviated from its initially planned leniency for vanquished states to a punitive approaches and a return to balance of power politics (pp.128 –129, 142–150). It must be emphasized that to achieve an enduring peace, "it must be a peace without victory…only a peace between equals can last" (p.127). As a result, the punitive treatment of Germany at war end was rejected by its people and leaders as unjust and as our preamble chapter showed, this scenario partly culminated into the World War II. In effect, the Treaty of Versailles was a failure not because of its inherent defects but rather because it was never fully implemented.

The fateful choices and decisions at the end of World War I, together with hegemonic ambitions, appeasement, collapse of international economy – depression – and certain individual leaders created World War II which was seen on the eyes of Germany as a second half of World War I. The twenty-seven years of relative peace was a recess – a period of rethinking, regrouping and re-strategizing. Although the end of the war ushered in The Cold War[15] – a power struggle between two main blocks: the United States and the Soviet Union, with two main foreign policy choices of deterrence and containment ended at the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 – the end of war settlements, created through the United Nations Organization has guided our path and guarded against any breach of peace that we vehemently enjoy today. It must be noted that policymakers did not repeat the mistakes of the World War I settlement. Policymakers traded

off moral values and expediency; proponent of world governance-ship – the United States – took charge of the leadership of the world; principles of equality and sovereignty were maintained. Collective security was adhered to and retributive measures of reconstitution, partition, neutralization rather than outright revenge and later reconciliation measures that resuscitated Germany and Japan who were the vanquished made end of war settlements just for all (pp.14–15; 71–72; 171–178).

Although today there are some global security challenges and other intrastate conflicts based on ethnic, religious and regional lines, the threat of interstate war leading to a global war is non-existence or at least very minimum. The world is a more orderly place today precisely because of progress in international governance and the deepening and thickening of norms of peaceful conflict resolution created through the United Nations and the overall end of World War II settlements based on liberal tenets. On the words of president John Kennedy "too often in the past, each war only planted the seeds of the next. We celebrate today the reconciliation…that has liberated us from that cycle of destruction" (p.154). The 21st century fateful decisions on war making and peace have taken on a new face because war dynamics have changed. What challenges our security today is far from one or two states attacking another state. Our threat comes from conflicts within states on tribal, religious lines and non-traditional security dynamics such as terrorism, environmental degradation, global warming, cyber conflict, poverty, diseases and hunger, human rights, among others.[16]

This is the concern of part four of the book. It looks more into moral and ethical values of war and peace vis-à-vis national and international interest. Quoting U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the authors noted "Yugoslavia's may be the war of the future: one waged between different tribes, harboring centuries-old grudges about language, religion, and territory, and provoking bitterness for generations to come" (p.215). Instead of State to State war, the authors showed how warfare is now "fought more frequently through multilateral collective armed force" using the Persian Gulf War of 1991 (pp.190–210) and the humanitarian intervention into Kosovo in 1999 (pp.228–236). The subject of a decrease in state vs. state wars received confirmation by Kegley and Raymond who asserted that "110 armed conflicts broke out around the world in the period between 1989 and 1999. These included 7 that broke out between states and 103 that erupted within states, with 9 of the latter resulting in external military interventions" and "less than one-third of these armed conflicts have been terminated by formal peace agreements" (p.185).

The change in the face of war must also have a corresponding change in the face of peace. Fateful decisions on peace have taken other forms such as preventive diplomacy, humanitarian intervention and its related concept of Responsibility-to-Protect, peace keeping as well as economic sanctions. As shown by the authors, although Iraq's "economy was vulnerable, Saddam Hussein was isolated, and the sanctions were applied decisively" (p.200), economic sanctions against Iraq "proved ineffectual as an alternative to military enforcement because they brought suffering to the civilian population and strengthened the Iraqi political elite the sanctions were designed to punish" (p.185) and of course as an authoritarian leader, "Saddam Hussein remained indifferent to hardships borne by his own people, there was no guarantee that Iraq's economic suffering would compel him to withdraw from Kuwait" (p.200). Although economic sanctions are liberal approaches, it does not always work.

Interventions, Responsibility-to-Protect and other forms of new peaceful decisions have their attended problems as they are "both descriptive and normative" and powerful states use them as a pretext to achieve their foreign policy interests. It dwells more on moral and ethical values and often assumed that States that have the capabilities to act always trade off with national interests. It is also argued to be at odds with Westphalian peace of non-intervention, sovereignty and equally of all states. Commenting on the intervention in Kosovo, Kofi Annan averred "Kosovo has cast in stark relief the dilemma of what has been humanitarian intervention: on the one side, the question of the legitimacy of an action taken by a regional organization without a UN mandate; on the other, the universally recognized imperative of effectively halting violations of human rights with grave humanitarian consequences. The inability in the case of Kosovo to unify these two equally compelling interests of the international community…can only be viewed as a tragedy" (p.214).

The arguments and questions against interventions, Responsibility-to-Protect and other forms of new peaceful decisions are real and cannot be glossed over. Thus since war has change and its peaceful decisions must also change, we must continue to find a more appropriate decisions and choices of peace to deal with the current forms of security threat. However, until this appropriate choice arises, we are better off with the current fateful decisions than without them because "the world cannot stand idly by while horror unfolds" (p.186), while rogue

leaders perpetrate mayhem and atrocities on civil society or mankind. We cannot expect to have another Rwanda or Kosovo or Somalia. In this case, we must turn our attention on areas such as Myanmar and Burundi before they become grave humanitarian concern.

It is clearly seen that Kegley and Raymond's prescription for wining war and peace lies in how victors treat defeated foes. This highly involves the moral and ethical dilemmas policymakers undergo when prescribing policy choices of war and peace (pp.245–266). This forms the conclusion part of the book "From War to Peace: Fateful decisions in International Politics" in its part five which is composed of only one chapter. Fateful decisions on war making, termination and eventual peacemaking are theoretically conditioned by realists who "earn their label by emphasizing consequences over moral principles and necessity over choice" and liberals who "begin with opposite premises, emphasizing duty consequences and moral imperatives over expediency" (p. 244).

The prescriptions the authors advised students and policymakers to consider when taking decisions on war and peace include carefully defining interests, national objectives and priorities in terms of calculating the full costs, risks and benefits of alternative courses of action (p.249); military strategies during war time should be coordinated with the end of war time political strategy for peacemaking – grand strategy – and must begin early (pp.250–252); states at war must know the character of their allies, adversaries as well as their own national public in terms of their desires and goals after war and their theoretical perspectives and what they accept as just and unjust (pp.252–254; 258–260); although passion for vengeance should not be ignored because "it is difficult to deny the satisfaction most humans feel when those guilty of some moral outrage receive their comeuppance, regardless of whether the penalty deters others from engaging in offensive conduct" otherwise "a sense of closure is never reached and private acts of retaliation are likely to follow", vengeance should be avoided but retributive punishment must be sought for the culpably guilty. (pp. 255–257).

In finding peaceful settlements at end of war, the authors clearly postulated that liberal tenets of trust in multinational and transnational institutions and corporations, friendly diplomacy, negotiations, deliberations, coordination and cooperation transcend over realist realpolitik approaches that usually put states and societies at gruesome and embittered confrontations. Throughout the various historical cases of war reviewed, any point where realist punitive measures were used as choices of decisions at war end resulted in other and a more severe war in later years. In effect, realism creates the mess and liberalism cleans it up. In two instances –Peloponnesian War settlement and Treaty of Versailles – liberal measures were adopted as end of war settlement but failed to result in a long term peace. The failure was not embedded in the liberal tenets itself but was a course of an outside agent.

In the case of Peloponnesian War, the cause was in Sparta's lack of a coherent grand strategy as war winded to a close as "little thought had been given to designing a political grand strategy for the postwar world" (p.24) and its lack of adequate bureaucratic mechanism thus "keeping Athens in check would require a level of cooperation the victors could not sustain" (p. 23). The Treaty of Versailles was also a failure not because of its inherent defects but because it was never fully implemented. To develop a sustainable peace at the end of war, we need a hall that would provide us "a place in which to forget old passions and prejudices and the grosser forms of selfishness; a place for good consideration, courtesy, patience, and the philosophic mind" (p.129). So to answer their questions directly: Why do states go to war? States go to war because vanquished of previous wars was or were never satisfied with the end of war settlement thus previous wars planted the seed of the next. And how can they create a lasting peace after the war? Lasting peace can be created by adopting liberal approaches to war settlement where victors would involve the vanquished in settlement negotiations because the vanquished have responsibilities in making peace or war either by accepting or rejecting settlements.

Despites some few flaws that have been pointed out, the simplicity of words, sentences and the breakdown of complex theoretical terms and concepts makes this book a good read for all students of International Relations and policymakers. The summary at the beginning of each chapter makes for easy understanding for review.

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[15] Nye SJ, Welch AD, 2012.

[16] Ibid.